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The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutions of accountability in Zambia in order to 
understand how social networks may influence such institutions not to discharge their mandates 
as expected from time to time (Noussi, 2012). Corruption, though lacking a universal 
definition, often refers to the abuse of office for personal gain; or the use of official position, 
rank or status by an office bearer for personal gain (Shah, 2007; Neu et al, 2013). For purposes 
of this study, a more appropriate definition is that advanced by Dye and Stapenhurst (1998) in 
which corruption is perceived as the abuse of public power or office for personal gain or for 
the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance. This definition is consistent with Lessig’s 
(2011) conceptualisation of ‘dependence corruption’ which arises when political institutions 
become corrupted because the pattern of influence operating upon individuals within those 
institutions draws them away from the intended influence. Unlike ‘quid pro quo corruption’ 
that often involves an exchange of favours by unrelated parties, dependence corruption does 
not take place via bribery but is instead rooted in a complex set of relationships and mutual 
obligations (Dawood, 2014). This kind of corruption is based on the gift and patronage 
economy (Bakre et al, 2017) that thrives on the giving and receiving of resources and political 
favours. Consequently, dependence corruption is often deemed to operate at the level of the 
institution rather than at the individual level (Dawood, 2014). 
Generally, corruption is believed to be a product of diverse factors including illiteracy, low 
income levels, poverty and a lack of sound institutional frameworks of governance (Svensson, 
2005; Lafenwa, 2009; Alabi and Fashagba, 2010). Others (e.g., Shah, 2007) contend that 
corruption within the public sector is a result of failed governance systems. It is equally 
believed that the roots of corruption in many African countries lie deep within bureaucratic and 
political institutions (Lubinda, 2011). Corruption is a universal scourge that transcends 
political, economic and ethnic frontiers. While corruption may generally be perceived as an 
African phenomenon, the developed world has not been spared from the vice. For instance, 
corrupt practices involving colossal sums of money have been reported within government 
circles in the United States (US), United Kingdom, Russia (Sikka and Lehman, 2015), Canada 
(Neu et al, 2015) and Italy (Sargiacomo et al, 2015). In Russia, the Prosecutor General 
estimated the total economic cost of corruption at more than $2.5 billion within a two year 
period (Cassin, 2016). Even in countries such as Norway and Sweden that are considered free 
from corruption, state owned companies have been reported to be involved in taking bribes. 
The former Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl, and his Christian Democratic Union were 
penalised for receiving illegal campaign funding. On the other hand, a large number of 
businessmen and government officials in France have been prosecuted on allegations of taking 
bribes when President Jacques Chirac was mayor of Paris (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011) and 
a cardiologist’s practice in the US agreed to pay millions of dollars to settle allegations that it 
had falsely billed federal health care programs (Cassin, 2016).  
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Attempts have equally been made in other places to abandon laws intended to promote 
transparency and accountability. The indicative case is the Dodd-Frank Act in the US that, 
despite its good intentions, has been attacked in certain quarters as being overly draconian 
(Taylor, 2012). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Transparency International’s 2017 
Corruption Perception Index ranks developing countries including Uruguay, Chile, Botswana 
and Namibia as ‘cleaner’ than industrialised countries such as Greece, Italy and Russia 
(Transparency International, 2018). 
Within the African context, Zambia offers an interesting social setting to undertake a study 
focusing on corruption and lack of accountability due to a number of high profile cases of a 
corrupt nature that have been reported in the media in the recent past. For instance, former 
Acting President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr Guy Scot, pardoned a convicted former Cabinet 
Minister and a convicted Deputy Minister during the 2014 Festive period using Presidential 
Powers of Pardon after the duo had briefly served part of their prison sentences. The incumbent 
President, His Excellency Mr Edgar Lungu, recently pardoned another convicted former 
Deputy Minister after serving a small portion of his sentence (Transparency International 
Zambia, 2015). The former President of the Republic of Zambia, Mr Rupiah Banda, was on 
30th June 2015 acquitted by the courts of law of alleged corruption crimes committed during 
his Presidential tenure between 2008 and 2011. Nonetheless, this news was received with 
mixed emotions by a cross section of society, with some suggesting that the former President’s 
strong ties with the incumbent may have played a prominent role in this acquittal (The Post, 1st 
and 3rd July; 26th October, 2015). Usher (2010) equally reports on a corruption scandal that 
took place at the Ministry of Health in 2009 involving millions of dollars of donor-funded 
resources. Despite the initial arrest of a single employee, the case is perceived to have involved 
a number of key senior staff at the Ministry. 
The above indicative cases of corruption point towards the role of social networks in facilitating 
these cases. However, the phenomenon of how social networks may perpetuate corrupt 
activities and influence the functioning of institutions of accountability remains under-
researched in the accounting literature (Neu et al, 2013; Avina-Vasquez and Uddin, 2016). In 
particular, studies drawing on primary evidence from respondents working within institutions 
of accountability remain limited (Noussi, 2012). Accordingly, there is a growing need for 
empirical evidence in terms of how social networks and the power of individual and collective 
agents may contradict and undermine institutions of accountability in order to explain the 
escalation in corrupt practices in the midst of a thriving institutional framework of accounting, 
auditing and accountability. A number of African countries are reported to have put in place 
various institutions of accounting, auditing and accountability to curb practices of corruption 
and thereby promote accountability (Otusanya et al, 2013, 2015). Despite the availability of 
such institutions, corrupt practices have been observed to be on the rise in recent years in some 
of these countries (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). The above studies also suggest that while causes 
of corruption may be diverse, government officials and the economically elite may form cartels 
to gain monopolistic power and undermine the authority of institutions of accountability.  
Such individuals and groups are perceived to colonise government and governance structures 
and institutions and, consequently, subvert laws and procedures intended to promote 
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transparency and accountability (Johnston, 2005; Tucker, 2013; Otusanya et al, 2015). 
However, empirical evidence highlighting such practices is still lacking especially in the 
accounting literature. Therefore, the aim of this study is to explore the role of social networks 
in perpetrating corrupt practices and how the influence of such networks may compromise the 
discharge of the mandates of institutions of accounting, auditing and accountability. The paper 
fulfils this aim through addressing two research questions:   
RQ 1: What factors explain escalating levels of corrupt practices despite increased 
institutional structures and control systems of accounting, auditing and accountability (Iyoha 
and Oyerinde, 2010, Transparency International, 2014)? 
RQ 2: How do individuals, groups and social networks influence the performance of these 
institutions in discharging their accountability mandates? 
By addressing these questions, the paper contributes towards filling the gap of undertaking 
accounting research of a critical nature focused on African contexts (Rahaman, 2010). The 
study is equally an attempt at providing empirical flesh to Laughlin’s (1991) ideas on 
organisational transformations and pathways such as colonisation that individuals and groups 
may draw upon in the course of change. This contribution is made possible through 
complimenting Laughlin’s ideas with insights from social network theory (Tucker, 2013). 
Laughlin (1991) contends that when certain changes such as shifts in accounting practices take 
place within the organisational environment, actors may resort to transformation processes 
including colonisation where change is forced upon the organisation by those who have power 
over resources, leading to major shifts in what constitutes that organisation. This study 
considers such change processes as having the potential to create and promote unethical 
practices such as corruption and consequently undermine the functioning of institutions of 
accounting, auditing and accountability. The next section reviews the functioning of 
institutions of accounting, auditing and accountability and how social networks may influence 
the discharge of their mandates. Section 3 discusses a conceptual framework for analysis while 
the research design is presented in section 4. Findings are presented in section 5 and discussed 
in section 6. The paper closes with concluding remarks. 
 
2. Institutions of accountability and the discharge of their mandates  
In many democratic economies, several institutions are mandated with enforcing matters 
related to public accountability. Throughout this paper, the terms ‘institutions of 
accountability’ and ‘institution of accounting, auditing and accountability’ are used 
interchangeably. These institutions include constitutional offices and supreme audit institutions 
(SAIs) such as Parliament (and its committees such as the Public Accounts Committee), the 
Judiciary, the Auditor General’s and the Accountant General’s Offices (Svensson, 2005; Iyoha 
and Oyerinde, 2010; Noussi, 2012).  
As a watchdog over public affairs, Parliament’s role embraces not only providing oversight 
functions over the Executive in the management of public resources but also making sound 
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laws for regulating government activities and the conduct of society at large (Otusanya et al, 
2015). Parliament is thus regarded as providing a critical institutional function of control in 
curbing undesirable conducts such as corruption through its legislative and oversight mandates 
(Lawal, 2007; Noussi, 2012). SAIs such as offices of the Auditor General (AG) and Accountant 
General (ACG) are empowered with constitutional mandates to prepare, review, interpret and 
report on the financial information provided by audited public entities, as well as on the ability 
to define responsibilities and to apply sanctions or process them before competent government 
agencies including courts of law (Insausti and Leal, 2014). SAIs are equally entitled to impose 
economic and disciplinary sanctions in accordance with relevant constitutional and legal 
provisions. In carrying out their mandates, SAIs are expected to report, be responsible for, and 
explain to citizens the administration and outcomes of their institutional work. These functions 
require the provision of information and explanation to citizens on matters related to the use of 
public office and resources.  
A number of studies (e.g., Lawal, 2007; Otusanya et al, 2013, 2015) indicate that most African 
countries have put in place institutional frameworks of accounting, auditing and accountability 
to curb undesirable practices of corruption and promote accountability. In addition to SAIs, 
such institutional structures include Public Accounts Committees, Anti-Corruption or Anti-
Money Laundering Commissions, etc. Despite the proliferation of such institutions, corrupt 
practices have been observed to be on the rise in recent years (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010; 
Transparency International, 2014). This position represents a contradiction; a paradox that 
requires further understanding. Although explanations for such contradictions are beginning to 
emerge, sufficient empirical evidence to explain this pattern is still lacking in the accounting 
literature in terms of why institutions of accountability may not perform as expected from time 
to time.  
While inherent structural weaknesses and a lack of autonomy for office bearers often 
compromise the effectiveness of these institutions in the discharge of their mandates (Lawal, 
2007), there have been escalating reports of officers operating in such institutions facilitating 
corrupt practices due to personal interests (Svensson, 2005; Otusanya et al, 2015). Findings by 
both Noussi (2012) and Otusanya et al (2015) suggest that patrimonial networks and kinship 
ties might weaken the effectiveness of institutions of accountability in the discharge of their 
mandate. The extent of corruption is likely to depend on the amount of monopoly and 
discretionary power that these individuals and their networks enjoy (Dye and Stapenhurst, 
1998). This power may lead to collusions between private actors and public officials or 
politicians for their mutual private benefit through patronage activity (Bakre et al, 2017). These 
networks and cartels may manifest in form of political, bureaucratic, media or business groups 
that build high-level networks with the capacity to control and stave off political and economic 
competition. In such cases, private individuals may ‘capture’ the legislative, executive and 
judicial apparatus of government for their own purposes (Shah, 2007).  
 
Johnston (2012) contends that such collusions are most likely to exist in settings where state 
institutions of accountability are either weak or moderately strong in their power of 
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enforcement. Accordingly, such connections enable social networks to facilitate outcomes of 
importance to individuals and groups (Burt, 2001, 2004; Cooper et al, 2013; Neu et al, 2013). 
As Johnston (2005, p. 27) has noted, ‘officials powerful enough to create monopolies and resist 
accountability are also powerful enough to renege on their side of the deal’. Noussi (2012) 
equally suggests that the thriving institutional framework witnessed in a growing number of 
less developed democracies results from responses to both internal and external pressures 
where institutions are established primarily for conformity and symbolic purposes. Such 
institutions are believed to be based on ‘folk remedies’ that offer little chance of success (Shah, 
2007). These scenarios entail that while institutions and processes of accountability may be 
formally implemented, their operationalisation usually lacks the political commitment needed 
to actualise the work of these institutions. To the contrary, corrupt practices may be embraced 
and institutionalised into society and value systems to the extent that corruption may no longer 
be considered as an aberration (Aluko, 2002; Otusanya et al, 2015). The next section presents 
a conceptual framework that is drawn upon during data analysis. 
 
3. Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework adopted in this study draws on insights from social network theory 
(SNT) to devise an analytical lens for investigating network activity and how power 
relationships may influence the functioning of institutions of accountability. Bourdieu’s (1977, 
1986) ideas of capital are also drawn upon to compliment SNT. Theoretically, a network is 
perceived as a set of relationships containing a number of objects and a mapping or description 
of relations between these objects.  The objects could be individual persons, groups of people 
or organisations that are not only connected but information and resources also flow between 
them. The flow of information and resources creates power and influence between individual 
actors and within these networks (Avina-Vasquez and Uddin, 2016). SNT focuses on 
understanding the characteristics of networks and how this interaction influences people’s 
thinking, preferences, opportunities and behaviours (Lucas and Myne, 2013). Consequently, 
SNT offers critical insights into the dynamic relationships between individual and collective 
agents of behavioural change in diverse social settings. A key concern of SNT is to comprehend 
how social networks facilitate the flow of information and resources between actors to 
influence cognitions, opportunities and behaviours (Tindall & Wellman 2001).  
One of the main purposes of SNT is to identify the most influential, important and powerful 
members of a social network, and how they influence the activities of those networks. For some 
time now SNT has been applied across a variety of research domains including social mobility, 
social stratification, policy networks, elites and power, healthcare and professionals’ 
interactions (Lucas and Mayne, 2013; Tasselli, 2014; Guven-Uslu, 2017). Three key concepts 
underline the nature of social networks: network density, centrality and brokerage (Burt, 2001, 
2004).  
While network density is a measure of the number of connections between actors compared 
with the maximum possible number of connections that could exist between the actors, network 
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centrality measures the extent to which an actor occupies a central position within the network. 
As an important concept for analysing power in social networks, centrality encompasses the 
idea of popularity or access to resources as indicated by the person who has many connections 
to other people (such as C in figure 1). Centrality depends on capital which Bourdieu (1986) 
perceives as any resource effective in a given social setting that enables one to appropriate 
specific benefits and participation and to acquire positions in society. Capital may also be 
regarded in terms of the economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources accumulated by 
individuals and groups of actors as they vie for power in institutional processes. The level of 
influence enjoyed by a given actor depends on the size of the network of connections they can 
effectively mobilise and on the volume of the capital possessed in their own right by each of 
those to whom they are connected. Accordingly, the ensemble of connections, relationships, 
friendships and obligations gives actors the power to act in relation to the quality and quantity 
of their relationships (Bourdieu, 1977).  
On the other hand, brokerage entails the extent to which the focal actor (E and F in figure 1) 
spans between other actors who are themselves not connected with each other (Burt, 2001; 
Tasselli, 2014; Avina-Vasquez and Uddin, 2016). These key actors are often responsible for 
playing an intermediary role of bridging structural holes that may exist between networks in 
order to facilitate the flow of information and resources between networks while gaining their 
own advantages from the transaction (Burt, 2000, 2004; Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007; 
Guven-Uslu, 2017). While SNT has the ability to provide mathematical measures such as 
centrality, density and path lengths, the theory is equally useful within critical/interpretivist 
research traditions for understanding the interdependent characteristics and activities between 
individuals, groups and organisations (Tucker, 2013; Guven-Uslu, 2017). By focussing on the 
social links between people, SNT enriches the analysis of society based on the socio-
demographic and economic attributes of individual actors, groups and external structures 
(Lucas and Mayne, 2013).  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Social networks may exist between hierarchical layers within organisations, organisational 
departments as well as within informal groups. Such social network structures are based on 
underlying laws and the propensity to self-organise through bypassing formal organisational 
hierarchies in pursuit of resources, influence and control. This influence leads to changes in 
beliefs, behaviours and organisational values (Mohrman et al, 2003). Through the power of 
resources, social networks colonise organisations to the extent of creating fundamental and 
lasting change in both the visible and invisible elements of an organisation. In this study, 
organisations and institutions of accountability are perceived as influencing and being 
influenced by individual and collective actors and networks of political, economic, and social 
nature existing within their social context (Laughlin, 1991; Tucker, 2013). This study seeks to 
explore the influence of both formal and informal social groups and networks within and 
around institutions of accountability to explain current accountability practices and challenges.  
Since some actors may be more influential within a group than others, it is important to adopt 
an agency perspective when considering the influence of social networks on individual and 
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collective behaviours (Lucas and Mayne, 2013). This study draws on this admonition by 
focusing on the influence of different agents and groups on the effective discharge of the 
mandates of institutions of accountability. While particularly useful for analysing activities and 
events within the public domain such as professional interactions (Tasselli, 2014) and board 
representations (Avina-Vasquez and Uddin, 2016), SNT may face limitations when analysing 
unethical activities and practices such as corruption where information is rarely publicly 
available. This limitation is revisited in the discussion and conclusion. 
 
4. Research methods 
This study’s research methods draw on insights from social network analysis (SNA) that 
focuses on interrelationships among actors and groups and how these influence individual and 
collective behaviours and practices (Burt, 2001; Tindall and Wellman, 2001). Most social 
network data is collected through specific interview design methods focusing on relationships 
between individuals, groups, organisations and institutions in terms of the nature of their 
interconnections and influences of their interactions (Lucas and Mayne, 2013). This 
understanding entails that studies drawing on SNT and SNA often adopt individuals, groups, 
organisations and institutions as the unit of analysis depending on the nature of activities 
detected within specific study settings. For instance, Tucker (2013) suggests that focusing on 
the group (the Archbishops Committee) was the appropriate approach for understanding 
funding changes that took place in the 1980s within the Church of England. This study adopted 
‘individuals’ and ‘groups’ as units of analysis in order to explore the influence of individual 
and collective actors on the discharge of the mandates of institutions of accountability. Such 
an approach equally enabled the investigation of challenges encountered by institutions of 
accountability to explain why they are prevented from performing as expected from time to 
time (Noussi, 2012).  
In order to explore these dimensions, empirical data were collected through archival evidence 
and semi-structured interviews with respondents drawn from different institutions of 
accounting, auditing and accountability. Such institutions include offices of the AG and ACG, 
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament, the Judiciary, the Anti-Corruption 
Commission and Transparency International – Zambia. These organisations and institutions 
are mandated either with the preparation of national accounts, reviewing, auditing and 
examining of such accounts, advocating for public and financial accountability, reporting and 
investigating cases of alleged financial mismanagement, and interpreting the law when such 
cases are brought for prosecution before the courts of law. Data collection that commenced in 
May 2015 was initially based on archival evidence that involved reading through PAC and 
AG’s reports together with treasury minutes from the Office of the Secretary to the Treasury 
for the period 2009 – 2014. This background study helped to understand the recurrent 
accountability issues within public institutions. The unearthed ‘thematic issues’ provided 
useful insights in the course of developing the interview protocol.  
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Based on a purposive sampling approach, interviews were conducted with 24 key respondents 
working within different institutions of accountability. While the study initially targeted a 
sample size of 30, the number of interviewees was influenced by uncontrollable factors on the 
part of researchers bearing in mind the sensitive nature of the subject matter. The respondents 
were distributed as follows: ten respondents were drawn from the AG’s office, four from the 
ACG’s office, five from the Anti-Corruption Commission, two from PAC, one from the 
Judiciary and two from Transparency International – Zambia. Fifteen (15) respondents were 
drawn either at director level or higher while the rest were just below director level. Out of the 
total sample, there were 10 accountants, 7 economists, 4 administrators and 3 lawyers by 
profession. In view of the sensitive nature of corruption matters (Otusanya et al, 2015), three 
respondents requested that the interview should be recorded only through note-taking rather 
than tape-recording. Interviews were conducted in English and lasted between 45 and 70 
minutes each. Recording each interview gave the researchers the opportunity to focus on the 
interview conversation and to examine interviewees’ responses (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Audio recordings were transcribed as soon as possible after the interview to enable the 
observation of emerging themes and the comparison and contrasting with existing ones. 
Transcripts were subsequently subjected to content analysis. This entailed coding the data in 
view of recurring themes that were deemed to address the study’s research questions. Data 
analysis was conducted based on identified accountability practices and challenges in order to 
compare and contrast the experiences of different individuals and institutions in their discharge 
of accountability mandates. The result of the coding process was the generation of a summary 
for each transcript which assigned the transcript content to different themes aggregated under 
a set of codes (Silverman, 2011). These themes are analysed in the sections below. 
 
5. Findings 
Consistent with the theoretical framework, empirical evidence presented below highlights the 
social factors and challenges that help to explain why institutions of accountability may not 
perform as expected from time to time. These factors are premised on three key issues: the 
centrality and prominence of government officials in corruption networks; politics, power and 
the institutionalisation of corruption; and collaborative activities of a corrupt nature interfacing 
internal and external networks. 
 
5.1 The centrality of government officials in corruption networks 
This theme responds to both research questions presented in the introduction since it 
demonstrates the general factors that explain the escalating levels of corruption and how certain 
individuals and groups affect the functioning of institutions of accountability. Archival 
evidence cited below reiterates the central role of government officials not only in the 
accountability process but also in suspected corruption networks.  
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For instance, Controlling Officers (COs) are responsible not only for authorising payments 
within government ministries but also provide explanations to the PAC on suspected cases of 
financial mismanagement based on the AG’s report. COs are also mandated to report suspected 
cases of corruption to law enforcement agencies for investigation purposes. Archival evidence 
presented below indicates that despite cases of a corrupt nature being consistently reported by 
PAC and the AG’s office over the period 2009 – 2014, there has been reluctance among COs 
to report these cases to investigative wings. COs instead opt to deal with such cases 
administratively while the outcome of such disciplinary action is rarely disclosed. Reporting to 
the Speaker of the National Assembly, the 2011 PAC report states that: 
What worries your Committee most is the apparent reluctance by Controlling Officers in most 
cases to report the matters to investigative wings, preferring instead to take administrative 
disciplinary action (National Assembly of Zambia, 2012, p. 2). 
In view of this reluctance by COs, PAC often resorts to escalating such complaints to the higher 
office of the Secretary to the Treasury. For instance, the 2010 PAC report pleads with the 
Secretary to the Treasury to ensure that all identified cases of financial misappropriation are 
reported to the Police and that COs hesitating to report such cases should be sanctioned. 
Your Committee, therefore, urges the Secretary to the Treasury to ensure that all cases of 
suspected misappropriation of funds are promptly reported to the Police for further 
investigations. Controlling Officers failing to take prompt action should be sanctioned 
(National Assembly of Zambia, 2011, p. 3). 
The inertia by COs to enforce accountability processes may be interpreted as shielding corrupt 
activities where COs may be also implicated. Primary data in section 5.1.1 indicate that senior 
government officials play a central role in facilitating activities of a corrupt nature, ultimately 
providing protective mechanisms for wrongdoers who are connected to the government. The 
data below equally highlight collusions existing between COs and junior officers who are 
connected to them through different mechanisms that are used in the course of processing 
irregular financial transactions. These factors are presented below. 
 
5.1.1 Social networks as protective mechanisms for wrongdoers 
Networks within government structures have been highlighted as providing protective 
mechanisms for wrongdoers who are also connected to senior government officials. Such 
networked and corrupt activities entail that those individuals who are well-connected to the 
government may get away with their crimes through bypassing and undermining accountability 
processes with the support of senior government officials. Data below suggest that even law 
enforcement agencies may avoid interrogating corrupt junior officers for fear of ramifications 
from higher offices. DMAAD explained: 
 
I might be the cashier in an institution and I’m connected to the PS [Permanent Secretary] or 
to the Minister... My office practically is very low but I draw power from that higher office. So 
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I’ll be doing things not in my own name but in the name of that office because if I go and report 
that some [investigative] officer is inconveniencing me; then tomorrow he will be transferred.  
The implication of this influence from senior government officials is that those charged with 
enforcing accountability practices may feel undermined and intimidated by the State machinery 
– leading to a compromise in the effectiveness of institutions of accountability. DP narrated 
instances where corrupt junior officers connected to senior government officers like Ministers 
end up threatening COs from taking corrective action. The potential consequences of 
disregarding such threats may include the dismissal of COs.  
Most of these Controlling Officers…one of the reasons why they do not take corrective action 
on some of the officers is the networks. I’m related to somebody at State House and I’m your 
junior. So if I commit some wrongs and you know about my relationship, you fear to take 
corrective action because when you do that you might go. We have people as low as drivers but 
more powerful than Controlling Officers. So before Controlling Officers take any corrective 
action they have to watch their backs.  
Consequently, social networks are seen here as creating not only interdependent relationships 
between actors at different levels of the institutional hierarchy but also the accumulation of 
power and influence that enables the creation of protective mechanisms (Bourdieu, 1977). 
These mechanisms are equally reported within judicial systems. Due to connections within the 
legal process, some individuals have been released shortly after commencing the judicial 
process through government prosecutors entering a nolle prosequi (discontinuing the court 
case) on the basis of insufficient evidence from the State. The suspicion is often that such 
individuals are being released from legal prosecution due to the influence of higher offices who 
have an interest in such cases. PRO lamented how one public officer who embezzled a colossal 
amount of donor funds got away with his crime in a suspicious manner. However, it is widely 
believed that this individual may have patronised government structures.  
Sometimes you cannot even serve [your prison sentence] if someone wanted to…The case which 
breaks my heart is the Kapoko case. All the information was there but two or three years down 
the line we heard that the State had entered a nolle. And then you hear that this person was 
sponsoring people in campaigns…then you get to understand why this case just fell off. 
Patronage is equally witnessed in terms of political cadres who have attained an elevated social 
status as a result of the support they provide to political parties and their officials. Such 
patronage activities do not only ensure that they have access to government resources (Bakre 
et al, 2017) but that they are also well-protected by government officials in case of prosecution 
for their corrupt practices. ED explained the interdependent relationships existing within these 
networks: 
 
There are political party cadres who are close to the powers that be. Just because of that close 
relationship that they hold with people in the Executive they feel they can do anything and law 
enforcement agencies cannot touch them. And sometimes true to the word, law enforcement 
agencies have failed to touch these people even when there is evidence of wrongdoing. 
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Such patronage and networked activities suggest that corruption networks may be entrenched 
within government and political institutions such that offenders always have a way out in case 
of prosecution. These unethical practices may also tempt accountability actors to abuse their 
authority and compromise accountability processes for the benefit of the networks they pay 
allegiance to (Dye and Stapenhurst, 1998). This dependence corruption (Lessig, 2011) was 
elaborated by PD: 
It’s not that we don’t have procedures, it’s just that people know that even if they circumvent 
these procedures, within the cartel they have someone probably who works for the Office of the 
Auditor General… and then they can get away with it. So if one of their colleagues is in trouble 
because they have not followed procedures or regulations, they speak to those people and then 
things are swept under the carpet. 
The interview statement below suggests that other corrupt activities may even be sanctioned 
by senior government officials. This network mechanism entails that junior officers may 
engage in corruption with impunity since their relationship with senior government officials 
provides assurances of their own safety in case their corrupt practices got exposed. DHRA 
explained: 
Mostly when junior officers do these things, they do them on instructions from senior officers 
and with impunity where they know that if anything [goes wrong] they are going to protect 
them. We have seen that in Zambia where people have done wrong things and there are powers 
shielding them from prosecution. So that is what brings about impunity - they misapply funds, 
they misappropriate, they know that they will be protected.  
The foregoing evidence reiterates the fact that while corruption networks may provide 
protective mechanisms to their members, they also undermine the functioning of institutions 
of accountability to explain why these institutions may not perform as expected from time to 
time (Noussi, 2012). 
 
5.1.2 The collusive nature of corruption 
What became evident during interviews is that corruption appears to be perpetrated through a 
well-orchestrated network of individuals linked to each other through some collusive 
mechanism. These individuals create networks targeted at achieving outcomes of common 
importance to members of their network through interdependent transactions (Burt, 2001). 
Consequently, social networks appear to involve transactions embracing hierarchical layers 
within public institutions. PALG explained: 
It’s not possible for a person like myself to embezzle government funds alone, there has to be 
some kind of connection or collusion starting from the lowest rank going up because the 
embezzling of funds in a machine organisation like government…I don’t think one individual 
can manage… 
DSA exemplified the collusive nature of corrupt activities. 
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A good case is what happened at the Ministry of Health, the Kapoko issue. Everyone 
was involved from procurement, internal audit, accounts, those who deal with 
stationary, those who carry files…it was everyone. So a cartel was created to make sure 
that there was no document… 
Some of these linkages and mechanisms of collusion include friendships, family relations and 
peers. These relationships entail that corrupt activities are committed in groups together with 
senior officers who may consequently find themselves in awkward positions to take 
disciplinary action on offenders when evidence emerges since they played a prominent role in 
these fraudulent transactions. DMAAD explained: 
If I’m the Permanent Secretary for this institution and I’m married to your niece who is the 
head of the Anti-Corruption Commission and you are probably the Chairperson of the Public 
Accounts Committee…you understand that kind of a thing?…And you as my colleague whom I 
worked with very closely…we did whatever we did together and now we have to discuss your 
issues. Honestly speaking, how am I going to recommend that you get arrested? 
Such close-knit relations suggest that individuals and institutions charged with accountability 
mandates find themselves in compromised positions where enforcing their duties may 
consequently jeopardise their relationships. Individuals equally fail to discharge their duties in 
other instances due to the fear of exposing their own crime while reporting the offenses of 
others whom they committed crimes with. These actors are perceived to be involved in the 
construction of strategies as they attempt to stifle accountability requirements through their 
activities. DSA explained: 
When your niece, sister or brother is involved in corruption, how do you start exposing them? 
Again people fail to report corruption done in a group because exposing one person eventually 
exposes everyone including the one reporting. 
Officers responsible for safeguarding accountability practices within government institutions 
may equally opt to conceal other people’s offences in order to maintain the stability of their 
corruption network. Some senior government officials are reported to shield junior employees 
who normally commit offences either on their behalf or in response to their directives. 
ADMAAD explained: 
Let’s say the two of us want to process an irregular transaction. The reasonable thing to do is 
to allow our cashier to process the transaction. Now the two of us have this information that 
the arrest of this one is also going to implicate us, so we will take a position to carpet her. 
Sometimes this is why you see that certain wrongdoers continue because they do not do it alone; 
there are senior people involved.  
Consequently, the involvement of senior officials in corruption networks does not only 
undermine their own authority to deal with matters when they are brought before them for 
action but equally compromises the functioning of institutions they work for. ED elaborated 
this point: 
The biggest problem is that Controlling Officers are always part and parcel of corruption 
networks and most of those irregularities are normally authorised by them as Controlling 
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Officers. So maybe they are a bit shy to recommend for drastic action because they are 
accomplices to these corrupt activities. 
Suspected corrupt activities of a collusive nature have also been reported in the Judiciary where 
it is believed that lawyers and judges collude in the course of granting favourable judgements 
to those being represented by lawyers belonging to their network. A recent newspaper editorial 
stated that: 
…It is difficult for a lawyer to engage in corruption alone, so they have other corrupt lawyers 
they work with. And when they go to the bench the league continues - hence some of the very 
poor decisions we see from our judges which smell of clear collusion with some lawyers. There 
are lawyers whose corrupt cases are always handled by the same judges…(The Mast, 22nd 
December, 2016, p. 4) 
These findings suggest that while sufficient institutions of accountability may have been 
implemented within government structures, the influence of individuals who normally operate 
through collusive mechanisms undermines the effectiveness of these institutions. These 
networks are based on the propensity to self-organise through bypassing formal organisational 
procedures and regulations in pursuit of resources, influence and control (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Laughlin, 1991). The next section presents corroborating evidence indicating that corruption 
and the failure by institutions of accountability to perform as expected may be linked to regimes 
that often regard corruption as a normal practice. 
 
5.2 Politics and power as drivers of corruption  
This theme primarily helps to answer RQ1 since it demonstrates how power and influence 
create shifts in social and cultural values (Bourdieu, 1986) and how this affects the functioning 
of institutions of accountability. As Laughlin (1991) argued, such shifts are pervasive since 
they may also affect behaviours, beliefs, and values of organisational actors and society at 
large. Interview accounts below point to the role of politics and power to explain accountability 
practices and the escalation in corruption levels (Gipper et al, 2013). For instance, it is believed 
that low levels of corruption were witnessed in the country during both the Kaunda and 
Mwanawasa regimes while the contrary is considered true about the Chiluba regime. During 
the other two regimes, institutions of accountability were empowered and supported in their 
fight against corruption. Consequently, a culture of fear to engage in corruption prevailed 
within society during these administrations. DHRA explained: 
Let us go backwards a bit before 1991 [before democracy and capitalism]. People used to be 
scared of getting what was not theirs. Now we entered into another regime where lifestyles 
changed…there was a new culture. But that cultural aspect was dealt with slightly when 
Mwanawasa was in charge…corruption had gone down a bit because there was that firm 
dealing with issues. The prison door was open so there was that fear [to engage in 
corruption]… 
While disputing the existence of a clear link between political regimes and the escalation in 
corruption levels, DAG contended that corruption-fighting regimes tend to abhor corrupt 
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practices and consequently empower institutions of accountability in their fight against corrupt 
practices. He cited the example of two regimes that demonstrated contrasting attitudes towards 
the fight against corruption.  
During the Chiluba era the more corrupt the person, the richer that person was. During the 
era of Mwanawasa…institutions like us [Auditor General], institutions like the Anti-Corruption 
Commission became more powerful and loud. 
ED corroborated this account and explained that during the reign of a corruption-fighting 
President, briefings between the Taskforce on Corruption used to take place on a weekly basis 
in order to guide decision making on the part of the President. He argued that the lack of 
punitive action on offenders by a corruption-friendly regime creates a culture where everyone 
believes that they can join the network of corruption without any ramifications. 
When the Head of State is reluctant to fight corruption, everyone jumps on the bandwagon. 
They will treat that as a culture of looting public resources. And when there is a Head of State 
who is very strong against corruption you see people backtracking… 
It has been observed during these ‘corruption-friendly’ regimes that a proliferation in 
institutions of accountability does not necessarily translate into a decline in corruption levels. 
Consequently, a corruption-friendly culture tends to spread within the country – potentially 
leading towards the institutionalisation of corruption. The institutionalisation of corruption 
leads to a change in value systems, cultural behaviours and the way government and society at 
large are governed (Laughlin, 1991; Tucker, 2013). The level of engagement in corrupt 
practices becomes a yardstick for social success such that those fighting corruption may be 
perceived to be alien and could even be intimidated (Aluko, 2002). Some respondents indicated 
that elements of institutionalisation were currently evident within the Zambian society. For 
instance, PD contended that corruption had become the way of running business transactions 
particularly within public institutions. 
Corruption has been institutionalised so much so that it has suddenly become the way of 
running business in public institutions. Most private companies have a small budget that is 
dedicated for bribing officials for things to move smoothly. So they know that once you go to 
engage with public institutions you need to have something to give the official so that things 
can move faster or for you to circumvent certain procedures. 
DP argued that despite the increase in the number of institutions of accountability witnessed in 
the country, most of these had been created by government for symbolic purposes as a way of 
playing to the gallery.  
He argued that these institutions are the work of rhetoric by political actors who wish to be 
viewed as conforming to global practices of good governance while deliberately leaving 
lacunas that can be exploited to circumvent the accountability system. 
The reason for the rise in corruption levels is because of singing to the gallery by government 
officials. They will put accountability institutions in place but there is no genuine commitment 
to those issues. Corruption is mostly perpetuated by people who hold public office because they 
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are the beneficiaries…So they will put these systems in place but they will leave certain lacunas 
within which they can manoeuvre… 
While corruption may not be fully institutionalised in terms of being openly practiced by 
leaders and citizens, it is believed that political actors in the country have not demonstrated 
sufficient commitment in terms of walking the talk of curbing corrupt practices. To the 
contrary, government and other political leaders appear to be beneficiaries of corruption and 
lack of accountability. DPAAD elaborated this point: 
You find that sometimes the leadership may be saying ‘zero tolerance against corruption’ but 
they do not walk the talk; corruption is even entrenched from where they sit. So how are they 
going to make sure that the Anti-Corruption [Commission] does its work? That is where there 
is a mismatch, so political will means that you are going to support the Anti-Corruption 
financially and even the work they do… 
One practice that is considered to reflect the (near) institutionalisation of corruption in the 
country is the increase in the number of convicted government officials subsequently being 
pardoned by the Presidency (referred to in the introductory section of the paper). Accordingly, 
the practice of pardoning criminals convicted of corruption by the courts is perceived to be 
tantamount to embracing corruption by the government. SIO explained: 
You cannot just pardon criminals because you have the Prerogative of Mercy. What that means 
is that you are sending a message to the people that it’s acceptable to be corrupt; it’s acceptable 
to embezzle funds or to abuse your office. So if corrupt people can be pardoned, what is going 
to stop me from doing it? 
The foregoing accounts indicate that political actors and institutions such as the Presidency 
enjoy considerable amounts of power and influence due to the political and economic resources 
at their disposal (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986). These resources equally enable them to assemble 
strong networks of individuals to the extent that corrupt practices are not only embraced by 
government officials but certain individuals are also shielded from prosecution. These findings 
also demonstrate how groups of political actors are capable of creating lasting and fundamental 
change in both the visible and invisible elements of society (Laughlin, 1991; Tucker, 2013) 
through supporting corrupt individuals and practices, albeit to the detriment of the work of 
institutions of accountability. The above accounts also demonstrate how corruption may thrive 
under capitalism due to the protection that the State may provide to wealthy individuals who 
can buy their way out. While capitalism and democracy may be perceived as panaceas for 
corruption, these findings suggest that the embracing of democratic and capitalistic systems 
may contribute to the escalation in corruption levels due to the prioritisation of individual gain 
at the expense of the majority benefit (Standing, 2016).  
Such tendencies may become prevalent through the transformation of wealth by the elite into 
political power that often corrupts political processes and generates laws and regulations 
favouring affluent societies within the country. In such instances, political actors usually 
develop crony-client relationships with big corporations and may care little for the needs of 
ordinary people as they wallow in poverty. The foregoing accounts also bear witness to the fact 
that accounting is not a neutral practice and is unable on its own to fight corruption – accounting 
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takes place in environments driven and shaped by political, economic and cultural struggles for 
power (Gipper et al, 2013) as witnessed by changing levels of corruption in the country 
depending on the individual occupying the Presidency. 
 
5.3 Collaboration between internal and external networks 
This analytical theme responds to RQ2 through demonstrating how social groups facilitate 
corrupt practices between internal and external actors and networks, thereby compromising the 
functioning of institutions of accountability. One of the key features regarding the functioning 
of networks is through brokerage which reflects the extent to which influential actors provide 
a linkage between actors who are themselves not connected with each other (Burt, 2001, 2004). 
Such brokerage activities thus demonstrate the interdependent nature of network activity. The 
interview statement below indicates that certain corrupt transactions and network activities 
require the effort of actors who filter information from internal networks within government 
structures to external parties and relay financial resources from external parties to internal 
networks through some form of brokerage. The linkage between internal and external networks 
is believed to exist in many public institutions that are now considered as a market for goods 
and services. A confidential informant elaborated the clandestine nature of corrupt practices 
and how these are facilitated by intermediaries linking internal networks with external 
networks and actors (Guven-Uslu, 2017). To uninformed observers these transactions appear 
legitimate but information and financial resources are being transmitted between members of 
different networks: 
You may see a truck transporting copper parked near a Customs Office. Don’t think that the 
driver is resting – he’s waiting for the Customs Officer whom the transporting company has an 
agreement with to come on duty. The driver is always in touch with the Officer who will clear 
the truck for free and leave the officer with some money. 
Such brokerage activities are often facilitated by couriers and middlemen who do not only relay 
information between networks but also facilitate the payment of bribes and other kickbacks 
(shown in figure 2). External networks are thus sustained by coalitions of actors that are 
strategically located in internal networks and play a pivotal role in shaping network activity to 
reflect the interdependent nature of these networks (Avina-Vasquez and Uddin, 2016). DPIDD 
explained: 
We have private individuals who work in collaboration with public office holders and they have 
intermediaries who do the day-to-day running around getting or facilitating bribes. They have 
middlemen who facilitate the work of certain groupings with common interests. 
Consistent with the above account, informal structures have emerged within and around 
government structures that facilitate the interface between internal and external networks in the 
process of executing corrupt transactions (figure 2). Accordingly, agents operating within these 
informal networks are seen to act as couriers for those intending to reach government structures 
for business where access is provided through the payment of bribes. PD explained: 
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There are certain individuals who do not even work for public agencies who you have to see in 
order for your contract to be approved. Once you pay the bribe, they go to speak to the big fish 
and they share the proceeds. So there are these informal structures that have been created 
around the formal structures that filter all the information and money and have created other 
procedures which are informal… 
Brokerage activity is perceived to be rampant particularly in the awarding of government 
contracts and procurement tenders. Such activities require internal actors to relay information 
to bidders of government contracts. Accordingly, these brokers facilitate critical interactions 
that are important for sharing, assimilating, and applying complex and surreptitious 
information associated with the interdependent functioning of these networks. ADMAAD 
elaborated: 
There are instances where corruption may have taken place but you will not find it written 
anywhere. For example, when engaging a contractor people may talk outside the formal 
arrangement and agree to say ‘let us award this job to this contractor’ without putting that in 
writing such that when the Procurement Committee sits they will make it look like the processes 
were properly followed.  
A key feature of these networks is the sharing of information between internal and external 
networks to the transaction for mutual benefit (figure 2). Within government procurement 
services such information entails that external parties are provided with key information that 
puts them at an advantage in terms of fulfilling requirements including contract prices to be 
quoted on bid documents. A PAC member explained: 
If this particular contractor should be picked, what they have to do is to furnish him with 
information about the amount he should bid…they will tell him to be the last one to bid so that 
they can look at other bids and tell him to bid a bit lower so that he gets the contract. 
In other instances internal networks have collaborated with external networks in the process of 
either falsifying accounting and financial documents or entirely obliterating evidence during 
criminal investigations. A member of PAC narrated that document falsification is a common 
practice within the brokerage activities of corruption networks. Lengthy processes involved in 
the audit of public institutions often provide the window of opportunity for individuals to 
falsify financial documents in an attempt to purport what never transpired. 
The Auditor General goes there and finds that the documents were not there and when they 
came before Public Accounts [Committee] we realised that they brought the documents. So we 
studied the documents and realised that these documents were written after the audit…The 
documents they were referring to were those that auditors had not admitted because they were 
false documents. 
DAG contended that rather than falsifying, these networks often collude through removing 
documents and evidence files from offices to ensure that those being investigated are acquitted 
by the courts of law. 
Falsification may not really be there but disappearance [of documents] where you go and audit 
but information has disappeared. I will give you the example at the Ministry of Health. In the 
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initial investigation we discovered that K10 million was embezzled but the laptop for the 
auditors and some documents disappeared while Police Officers guarded the premises. What 
is appearing in court now is only K1.2million…  
DAG further explained that instances involving document disappearance and falsification have 
in the past led to controversy between the AG’s office and investigative wings after documents 
submitted for prosecution purposes disappeared while in the custody of investigators. The 
above findings reiterate that viewing organisational interactions only from a formal perspective 
may neglect important information about the cross-connections that exist between and across 
formal structures and informal relationships that often bypass formal organisational structures 
(Tucker, 2013). These findings thus provide empirical flesh to Laughlin’s (1991) framework 
by demonstrating how brokerage activities of social networks may create processes that have 
the potential to change and undermine the functioning of institutions of accountability. The 
foregoing findings have been summarised as shown in figure 2 to depict the interpretative 
nature of social networks, influential actors and the connections between internal and external 
networks. Figure 2 equally demonstrates the interdependent relationships existing between 
internal and external networks in the process of facilitating corrupt transactions for achieving 
outcomes of common interest (Burt, 2001; Tucker, 2013). 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
6. Discussion of findings 
This study aimed to explore the role of social networks in compromising the discharge of the 
mandates of institutions of accountability through the facilitation of corrupt practices. The 
foregoing findings depict certain key aspects regarding social network activity to explain why 
institutions of accountability may not perform as expected from time to time (Noussi, 2012).  
 
6.1 Government officials as central actors in corruption networks 
Empirical evidence presented in the previous section and summarised in figure 2 highlights the 
presence of networks of a corrupt nature operating within certain government structures that 
undermine the functioning of institutions of accountability. These networks appear to be 
championed and perpetuated by powerful government officials and institutions including the 
Presidency, Ministers, COs and Procurement Committees.  
In total dereliction of their accountability mandates, these officials and institutions have 
assumed a central role in propagating corrupt practices within government structures and 
institutions of accountability. As influential actors drawing on resource and position power 
(Bourdieu, 1986), COs are perceived to have crafted networks of a corrupt nature around them 
using friends, family and peers. Corrupt networks have equally been forged with junior officers 
who often engage in corrupt practices fully aware that the CO will protect them from potential 
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prosecution. COs have thus assumed the role of hubs within vertical and lateral networks that 
have created protective mechanisms for wrongdoers. Despite the absence of explicit evidence 
in terms of size, these networks appear to be of relatively high density in view of the number 
of complaints in both PAC and AG’s reports linking COs to various individuals and activities 
of a corrupt nature. The resource power and influence enjoyed by government officials has led 
to the colonisation of institutions and processes of accountability (Laughlin, 1991; Tucker, 
2013), with the consequence that institutions of accountability are prevented from fulfilling 
their mandates effectively. This colonisation is particularly exhibited through the inertia by 
COs to report to investigative wings suspected cases of a corrupt nature as recommended by 
PAC and the AG’s office. Such practices point to the entrenched nature of corruption within 
government institutions (Lubinda, 2011).  
The foregoing findings equally bring to the fore the central and influential role of political 
actors and institutions such as the Presidency and the Executive to explain escalating levels of 
corruption and the challenges faced by institutions of accountability in fulfilling their mandates. 
Consistent with issues raised in the paper’s introduction, these findings demonstrate the 
important role that the economic, social and political contexts play in propagating corrupt 
practices due to the protection that the State provides on corrupt individuals who transact 
favourably with the politically elite. These findings are not peculiar to Zambia and Africa but 
are in tandem with events from developed country contexts. Examples include BHP Billiton 
that agreed to pay millions of dollars to settle charges after BHP paid for government officials 
from various countries to attend the 2008 Olympics in Beijing as enticement for pending 
contract negotiations (Cassin, 2016) and Hewlett Packard that paid bribes to government 
officials in Russia to secure contracts for computer hardware and software worth an estimated 
$42 million (Sikka and Lehman, 2015). 
 
6.2 Politics and power as drivers of corruption 
Corruption levels together with attached vices are reported to thrive during the reign of 
individuals displaying a friendly attitude towards corrupt practices. These leaders have a 
propensity to undermine, bypass and circumvent legal and judicial systems and processes 
together with the functioning of institutions of accountability as they endear themselves to 
corrupt elements in society who usually patronise the corridors of power. In order to suppress 
the work of institutions of accountability, such actors resort to co-opting and intimidating 
investigative agencies into their corruption networks (Johnston, 2005). The desire to appease 
members of their corrupt networks leads to the compromise of accountability processes as 
witnessed by questionable nolle prosequis for accused individuals, Presidential Pardons for 
convicted criminals and an array of other favours. Conversely, members of these networks also 
engage in patronage activities including funding political entities and the party in government 
in exchange for these favours. This reciprocity depicts mechanisms through which social 
network connections facilitate rewards and outcomes of importance to individual and collective 
actors (Burt, 2001; Worrel et al, 2013). During such regimes, the work of institutions of 
accountability may become ineffective since their efforts may be stifled by political leaders 
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and their networks, including constraining funding structures. Consequently, accountability 
actors may remain with limited options but to comply with the demands of corrupt politicians 
(Bakre et al, 2017). Consistent with Lessig’s (2011) conceptualisation of dependence 
corruption, the above positions bare witness on how change takes place within Laughlin’s 
(1991) ideas of organisational transformation to the extent of affecting the very purpose of an 
organisation through the colonisation of institutions of accountability by influential actors who 
enjoy position and resource power (Bourdieu, 1986). 
In a different vein, institutions of accountability may be established during corrupt regimes for 
symbolic purposes to fulfil the accountability expectations of external stakeholder groups while 
corrupt activities are perpetuated by government officials in a clandestine manner. The 
foregoing findings indicate that while institutions of accountability may be formally 
implemented to an acceptable standard, their functioning usually lacks the political support 
needed to empower actors operating within these institutions. In view of the political malaise 
to fight corruption and empower institutions of accountability exhibited during corruption-
friendly regimes (Aluko, 2002), corruption and other vices may attain a status of (near) 
institutionalisation where corrupt practices begin to become normal and acceptable within 
society. During such regimes, networks of a political nature presided over by influential actors 
like the President and Ministers may subdue and undermine the power of individuals and 
institutions of accountability. Individuals working within institutions of accountability who 
wish to pursue corruption cases risk suffering consequences from political authorities including 
job losses.  This point is exemplified by one respondent who intimated that ‘if you want to keep 
your job, don’t fight corruption; just appear to be fighting corruption’. Such a polity promotes 
degradation in moral and ethical values, facilitates the emergence of parochialism and the 
elevation in society of individuals and groups thriving on plundered resources – leading to a 
compromise in the functioning of institutions of accountability.  
 
6.3 The role of brokerage in corruption networks 
Brokerage, as reflected by the interface and interdependence between unrelated internal and 
external networks, flourishes within government circles since government is regarded as a 
market for goods and services. Brokerage activities usually make it difficult for institutions of 
accountability to detect the occurrence of corruption since corrupt activities take place both 
remotely and in a clandestine manner. The work of couriers of information and bribes creates 
complexities in the effort by institutions of accountability to untangle network activity (Guven-
Uslu, 2017).  
Corruption perpetrated by government officials is often propagated through agents who span 
networks involving formal government structures and informal networks that circumscribe 
government structures (figure 2). These intermediaries help to bridge structural holes that may 
exist between internal and external networks to facilitate transactions of a corrupt nature while 
gaining their own advantages. To an outside observer, the decisions made by government 
structures including Procurement Committees may seem to follow laid down procedures and 
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regulations. Yet the undercurrent in these decisions is often generated through surreptitious 
interactions between members of internal and external networks who speak to each other 
outside formal structures through the facilitation of diverse intermediaries.  
These networks also display collaborative and interdependent tendencies in the course of 
criminal investigations involving members of their groups through either falsification or 
obliteration of evidence. Paradoxically, some documental evidence has disappeared through 
the handiwork of law enforcement agencies or while in the custody of investigative wings. This 
tendency suggests that corruption networks often enlist the help of members of institutions of 
accountability who may get involved in corrupt practices in complete disregard of their 
mandate. These network interactions do not only display various mechanisms through which 
internal and external structures are bridged but also enable feedback to be channelled to 
important ties in the network (Tucker, 2013). Therefore, the foregoing findings have identified 
central and influential individuals and institutions including the Presidency, the Executive, COs 
and Procurement Committees (figure 2). What is evident from the foregoing findings and 
discussion is the existence of different kinds of networks within the Zambian context. While 
internal and external networks have been identified as depicted in figure 2, it appears that some 
of these networks may be spawned by the accountability systems themselves due to weaknesses 
inherent in the systems while others are familial networks arising from practices of nepotism 
and favouritism. One key weakness in the system design that begets systemic networks of 
corruption is the presence of the human interface in the processing of transactions (particularly 
those of a financial nature) rather than having non-human platforms such as online transactions 
that remove the need for human-to-human contact.  
 
7. Concluding comments 
Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, this study contributes to the literature in several 
dimensions. Firstly, the study responds to the call by Rahaman (2010) urging for more 
accounting studies of a critical nature focused on African contexts. The study equally 
contributes towards providing empirical flesh to Laughlin’s (1991) framework through 
complementing that framework with social network theory as recently heralded by Tucker 
(2013). This contribution is fulfilled through studying the dynamics involved in accountability 
processes where social networks dominate.  
 
By studying accountability practices through the lens of social network theory, the study 
enhances our understanding of how corrupt practices may be entrenched in complex networks 
of political, economic and social actors who draw their influence from resource and position 
power (Bourdieu, 1986) through collusive and brokerage mechanisms. These findings are 
consistent with global events of a corrupt nature where key government officials and other 
influential individuals have been reported to play a critical role in facilitating and perpetuating 
corrupt practices (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011; Neu et al, 2015; Sikka and Lehman, 2015; 
Cassin, 2016). In view of the scarcity of studies drawing on primary evidence to study 
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corruption (Noussi, 2012), this study thus provides an empirical contribution towards a better 
understanding of the role played by social networks on the functioning of institutions of 
accountability by drawing primary evidence from internal organisational actors. Contrary to 
Alabi and Fashagba’s (2010) findings where the Legislature was deemed to play a key role in 
facilitating corrupt practices in Nigeria, this study indicates that corruption is mainly 
perpetrated by the Executive. Accordingly, the study helps to understand that the influence of 
social networks on the functioning of institutions of accountability is made possible within 
political networks based on the economic, political and social power enjoyed by individuals 
and institutions operating within such networks (Bourdieu, 1986). 
These findings present fundamental implications in terms of accountability practices and the 
functioning of institutions of accountability in the country. Firstly, this study helps us to 
understand that activities of a corrupt nature are often undertaken through well-connected 
groups and networks that make it difficult for institutions of accountability to detect and 
untangle such activity. Further, the study suggests that accountability institutions that are 
currently in place in Zambia may be incomplete in view of the prevalence of practices such as 
nepotism that is usually prohibited in a number of countries. The findings above also suggest 
that accountants and other accountability actors appear to have forgotten that accounting is not 
just a technical discourse for enhancing one’s economic status – accounting is an ethical 
profession. Rather than acting as its deterrent, accountability systems in the country appear to 
abet corruption (Soll, 2014) through accountants and other accountability actors getting 
involved in the facilitation and perpetuation of corrupt practices. Such tendencies may not be 
entirely surprising within a capitalist environment where private and State actors prioritise the 
maximisation of individual economic benefits at the expense of corporate good. As Standing 
(2016) contends, capitalism focuses on benefitting a few individuals rather than the majority 
through transforming wealth into political power that corrupts political processes and generates 
laws and regulations favouring the wealthy.  
Going forward, the promotion of accountability practices and the effective functioning of 
institutions of accountability needs to commence with government institutions including the 
Presidency, the Judiciary and the Executive. This would require the commitment of 
government officials to ‘walk the talk’ in terms of curbing corrupt practices, meting out 
stringent punishment on offenders and defending sound accountability practices and the work 
of institutions of accountability.  
 
However, this may be easier said than done since such a change requires a fundamental political 
and cultural shift at individual, organisational, institutional and societal levels in terms of 
abhorring unethical conduct and respecting and upholding national laws, rules and regulations. 
In view of the monopoly of power exhibited by offices such as the Presidency, there is equally 
need to reform governance systems so as to provide sufficient autonomy to institutions of 
accountability and limit the power of certain offices so as to avoid the colonisation of 
accountability processes by government officials and other political actors (Laughlin, 1991). 
There is a great need to put institutions in place which should hold everyone, including the 
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President and Ministers, accountable to the Zambian people in the light of wrongdoing. 
Dismantling the corrupt network activities inferred from the data entails a complete top-down 
change in systems of politics, governance, wealth distribution and social values. Respondent 
accounts intimated how low levels of corruption were witnessed in the country during the 
Mwanawasa regime through an overhaul of systems that led to the empowerment of institutions 
of accountability in their fight against corruption. As indicated earlier, one such systemic 
overhaul could involve the removal of human-to-human interfaces in the course of (financial) 
transactions through the introduction of electronic (payment) platforms. It is hoped that one 
day an individual who believes in and walks the fight against corruption and its adverse effects 
will rise to the Presidency and support the empowerment of institutions of accountability to 
discharge their mandate autonomously and effectively.  
From an accounting perspective, this study demonstrates how social networks may influence 
the relationship between accounting, political and organisational systems in terms of how 
actors operating within institutions of accountability may compromise and abuse their 
mandates in order to conform to the pressure of influential actors operating within dominant 
networks and to fulfil the needs of other networks possessing similar needs (Laughlin, 1991). 
This study is not without limitations. Due to the clandestine nature of corruption activities, 
however, the study was unable to determine measures of centrality and density since these 
details were not forthcoming during interviews. Such information could only become available 
if willing individuals involved in corruption could be identified so that they explain who they 
conduct their corruption with together with the number of connections involved and the most 
influential individuals in those networks. The availability of such information could also enable 
institutions of accountability to streamline their operations by targeting key and influential 
individuals in corruption networks. One potential opportunity for accessing such data could be 
through speaking to retired executives of institutions of accountability who might express 
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